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In response  to the  economic  and  ﬁnancial  crisis, the  EU has  adopted  a new  regulatory  framework  of  the
banking  sector.  Its  central  elements  consist  of new  capital  requirements,  the single  rulebook,  and  rules
for bank  recovery  and  resolution.  These  legislations  have  been  adopted  to reduce  the  call  for  government
bail-out  of distressed  banks  in  future  crises.
The  present  study  performs  a detailed  quantitative  assessment  of  the reduction  in  public ﬁnance  costs
brought  about  by  the  introduction  of  these  rules.  We  use  a microsimulation  portfolio  model,  which
implements  the  Basel  risk  assessment  framework,  to  estimate  the  joint  distribution  of bank  losses  at  EU
level.  The  approach  incorporates  the  complete  safety-net  set up in EU  legislation  to  absorb  these  losses,
explicitly  modelling  enhanced  Basel  III capital  rules,  the  bail-in  tool  and the  resolution  funds.
Using a near-full  sample  of commercial,  cooperative  and  savings  banks  in  the  EU,  we  quantify  the  cumu-
lative  effects  of  this  safety-net  and the  contribution  of  each  individual  tool  to the  total  effect.  Considering
a  crisis of a  similar  magnitude  as  the recent  one,  our results  show  that  potential  costs  for public  ﬁnances
decrease  from  roughly  3.7%  of EU GDP  (before  the  introduction  of  any  new  tool)  to  1.4%  with  bail-in,
and  ﬁnally  to  0.5%  when  all the  elements  we  model  are  in  place.  This  latter  amount  is  very  close  to  ourapital requirements
ail-in
esolution funds
estimate  of leftover  resolution  funds  and  the size  of the  Deposit  Guarantee  Scheme.
This  exercise  extends  the  quantitative  analyses  performed  by  the European  Commission  in its  Economic
Review  of  the Financial  Regulation  Agenda  by developing  additional  scenarios,  crucial  robustness  checks,
simulations  for different  annual  data  vintages,  and  by implementing  some  methodological  improve-
ments.
©  2016  The  Authors.  Published  by  Elsevier  B.V.  This  is  an  open  access  article  under the  CC  BY-NC-ND. Introduction
The world has experienced in recent years the most severe eco-
omic and ﬁnancial crisis since the Great Depression of 1929. It
tarted in 2007 in the US, with the collapse of the residential mort-
age market and the collapse of Lehman Brothers. The crisis sent
hock waves to the ﬁnancial system worldwide: for the ﬁrst time,Please cite this article in press as: Benczur, P., et al., Evaluating the eff
to bail-out? J. Financial Stability (2016), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jfs
iants of the ﬁnancial world faced severe distress and some of them
ent into bankruptcy (see e.g. Blanchard, 2009; Claessens et al.,
010; Laeven and Valencia, 2013).
∗ Corresponding author. Tel.: +39 0332 783832; fax: +39 0332 785752.
E-mail addresses: peter.benczur@jrc.ec.europa.eu (P. Benczur),
iuseppina.cannas@jrc.ec.europa.eu (G. Cannas), jessica.cariboni@jrc.ec.europa.eu
J. Cariboni), francesca.di-girolamo@jrc.ec.europa.eu (F. Di Girolamo),
ara.maccaferri@jrc.ec.europa.eu (S. Maccaferri), marco.petracco@jrc.ec.europa.eu
M.  Petracco Giudici).
ttp://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jfs.2016.03.001
572-3089/© 2016 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access
y-nc-nd/4.0/).license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
As a ﬁrst response to the crisis, many governments and cen-
tral banks intervened and bailed out failing banks. In the period
2008–2012, the total costs borne by European governments to sup-
port the ﬁnancial sectors in the forms of capital injection and asset
relief (excluding guarantees) amounted to 600 billion D , corre-
sponding to 4.6% of 2012 European GDP (see European Commission,
2014b).
These numbers explain why a strong consensus emerged that
ad-hoc ex-post ﬁnancial support is no more sustainable, and one
must ﬁnd ways to resolve failing banks at no or limited costs to
taxpayers and society (e.g. Huertas, 2010). There is a clear agree-
ment on the need for a better designed, more efﬁcient and more
integrated framework to improve the stability of the banking sec-ectiveness of the new EU bank regulatory framework: A farewell
.2016.03.001
tor and to protect public ﬁnances (Schoenmaker and Gros, 2012;
Huertas and Nieto, 2012), capable of dealing effectively with a cri-
sis situation, together with a more centralized supervision (Beck,
2012; Goyal et al., 2013; Dewatripont, 2014).
 article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/
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The discussion on the true effectiveness of the proposed tools is
still ongoing. Avgouleas and Goodhart (2015) discuss in details the
economic and legal pros and cons of bank bail-in regimes and inARTICLEFS-423; No. of Pages 17
 P. Benczur et al. / Journal of Fin
Regulators have proposed and adopted a number of different
easures to limit the effects of bank losses and failures on the
hole ﬁnancial and economic system, in the case of future crises.
he set of these ﬁnancial instruments is generally referred to as
he ﬁnancial safety-net.  A comprehensive summary of the ﬁnancial
eforms adopted by the European Union (EU) is discussed in the
conomic Review of the Financial Regulation Agenda (from here
nwards: ERFRA; see European Commission, 2014a). These reforms
o not only address the banking sector, but they also look at ﬁnan-
ial markets and their infrastructure, shadow banking, the stability
nd resilience of the insurance sector.
In this paper, we model the impact of the following major
eforms dealing with the banking sector:
The new Capital Requirement Regulation and Directive IV
(CRR/CRD IV, European Parliament and Council, 2013), which
transposes the Basel III Accord into EU legislation and enhances
the quality and quantity of capital that banks should set aside to
tackle unexpected losses.
The Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive (BRRD, European
Parliament and Council, 2014), which sets up a series of rules
and resolution tools, such as the sale of the business or shares of
the institution under resolution, the setting up of a bridge insti-
tution, the separation of the performing assets from the impaired
or under-performing assets of a failing institution, and the bail-
in of shareholders and creditors of a failing institution. National
resolution funds are also established to resolve distressed banks
at national level.
The Single Resolution Mechanism Regulation (European Council,
2014), which foresees that the resolution funds of countries
participating in the banking union1 are pooled into a single res-
olution fund.
We  quantify the cumulative effects of the adopted pieces of
egislation on government contingent liabilities, i.e., on public
nance costs conditional on a (severe) ﬁnancial crisis. Starting from
ublicly available balance sheet data of nearly all commercial, coop-
rative and savings banks in the EU, we use a microsimulation
ortfolio model (originating from De Lisa et al., 2011), which imple-
ents the Basel risk assessment framework, to estimate the joint
istribution of bank losses at EU level. This model, which is referred
o as SYMBOL (SYstemic Model of Bank Originated Losses), allows
imulating the joint distribution of bank-level losses in excess of
apital under various minimum capital requirement levels and
afety-net tools such as bail-in and resolution funds. The model
an thus be used to assess the reduction in the amount of losses
hat remains uncovered after the intervention of the available tools,
nd that could potentially hit public ﬁnances. Aggregating data over
he entire banking system, our method allows assessing the over-
ll reduction in potential public ﬁnance costs deriving from the
dopted policies.
SYMBOL has been used by the European Commission as a tool for
x-ante quantitative impact assessments of a number of legislative
roposals (see Marchesi et al., 2012; European Commission, 2011b;
ariboni et al., 2012; Cannas et al., 2013c), for the cumulativePlease cite this article in press as: Benczur, P., et al., Evaluating the eff
to bail-out? J. Financial Stability (2016), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jfs
valuation of entire ﬁnancial regulation agenda (ERFRA, European
ommission, 2014a), and for the assessment of contingent liabil-
ties linked to public support to the EU banking sector during the
risis (European Commission, 2011a, 2012a; Benczur et al., 2015).
1 The banking union transfers the banking supervision from national to European
evel and provides for a more centralised management of banking crises. It is made
p  of a single rule book for ﬁnancial institutions, the Single Supervisory Mechanism,
nd the Single Resolution Mechanism, all of which are mandatory for all euro area
ember States and open to all other countries in the EU. PRESS
l Stability xxx (2016) xxx–xxx
Besides presenting a more detailed, formal and thorough ver-
sion of the ERFRA exercise (European Commission, 2014a; Cariboni
et al., 2014), our paper extends its results along three major lines.
First, it models the single resolution fund for countries participat-
ing in the banking union. Second, it performs the simulation using
data from multiple years (2007, 2009, and 2012), documenting the
impact of recent bank balance sheet trends on the results, and
analysing the sensitivity of the ﬁndings to different data vintages.
Third, it allows for a richer correlation structure among banks and
evaluates its impact on the results.
This latter aspect is particularly important. De Lisa et al. (2011)
demonstrated that the degree of commonality (correlation) among
the shocks hitting banks has a major impact on the extreme tail
percentiles of the distribution of deposit guarantee scheme losses,
which increase strongly as the correlation coefﬁcient increases. One
of our main objectives with this paper is to explore the robustness of
the Commission’s ERFRA exercise to this key ingredient. This overall
commonality among bank shocks can come from two  main sources:
exposure to common shocks and forms of contagion. Though we
do not explicitly model contagion effects through the interbank
market (direct contagion),  our framework can represent different
degrees of commonality by different shock correlation structures.
For our quantitative exercise, we  make the following main
assumptions. First, results are calibrated to match the gravity of
the 2008–2012 crisis,2 i.e. a severe and systemic crisis event. Sec-
ond, we work under the conservative assumption that all simulated
bank excess losses and recapitalization needs that cannot be cov-
ered by the safety-net fall on public ﬁnances.3 Third, we assume
that full bail-out prevents the spreading of contagion through the
interbank market. Fourth, the safety-net is considered able to fully
rule out direct contagion effects; more speciﬁcally, we  assume that
all distressed banks are resolved and recapitalized.4
Our results show that potential costs for public ﬁnances of a cri-
sis similar to the recent one decrease from roughly 3.7% of EU GDP
(before the introduction of any new tool) to 1.4% with bail-in, and
ﬁnally to 0.5% when all the elements we model are in place. We
view this as a major reduction. According to these ﬁndings, bail-in
is the tool that contributes most to the reduction in the poten-
tial costs for public ﬁnances. This reinforces results of Breuss et al.
(2015), who ﬁnd that bail-in is effective in reducing the fall of GDP
in the Euro Area core countries, and thus has also advantages from
a macroeconomic perspective.
At the same time, our results imply that the modelled safety-net
design would still leave the possibility of some public ﬁnance costs
in case of a very extreme crisis event. This is partly due to our con-
servative modelling approach to the safety-net, i.e. allowing the
use of available tools at their minimum levels (see more details
in Section 2). More importantly, supervisors have additional tools
to absorb these residual losses, including among others the left-
over resolution funds and parts of the Deposit Guarantee Scheme.
We have estimated the additional capacity of these two  tools to be
around 0.3–0.4% of EU GDP, almost equalling our estimated 0.5%.ectiveness of the new EU bank regulatory framework: A farewell
.2016.03.001
2 Bank losses and recapitalization needs triggered by the last crisis are proxied
by  state aid data, in particular the total recapitalization and asset relief provided to
banks over 2008–12 (around 600 bn euro), see European Commission’s DG Com-
petition State Aid Scoreboard, European Commission (2014b) and Benczur et al.
(2015).
3 The severity of the systemic crisis assessed in this exercise is higher than that
of  the “2014 EU-wide stress test” performed by the EBA and results cannot directly
be  compared due to different methodologies.
4 Potential contagion across banks through bail-in is disregarded due to scarce
data. Some preliminary results are already available in Fontana et al. (2015b).
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vidual bank depends upon an estimated (average) implied obligor
probability of default (IOPD) in each bank’s portfolio. The IOPD is
basically a function of an adjusted Risk-Weighted Asset (RWA)ARTICLEFS-423; No. of Pages 17
P. Benczur et al. / Journal of Fin
articular the potential risks they may  pose in domestic and cross-
order frameworks. They also argue that one may  want to keep
 last layer of public insurance for the ﬁnancial system. A similar
ase is made by Dewatripont (2014). A different view is taken by
he Five Presidents’ Report (Juncker et al., 2015), which proposes
o complete the banking union by adding a ﬁscally neutral common
ackstop (i.e. reaching a public ﬁnance cost of zero in the future).
Despite the recognized need to establish a safety-net for banks,
o the best of our knowledge academic research has so far concen-
rated on individual tools, and few quantitative approaches have
een proposed to analyse the cumulative effects of such tools. One
xception is Breuss et al. (2015), using a DSGE model to simulate the
ounterfactual response of euro area GDP to a large adverse ﬁnan-
ial shock under different safety-net setups. The paper ﬁnds that the
rop in GDP would have been smaller by 10–40%, depending on the
et of mechanisms adopted. Apart from the fact that our approach
s not meant to assess linkages to the rest of the economy, the main
ifference lies in our granularity of modelling the safety-net and
hus these results cannot be easily compared with the ﬁndings of
his paper. Breuss et al. (2015) follows a macro approach, and model
he safety-net as a certain part of banking losses being directly
icked up by creditors, the government and/or the single resolution
und. In contrast, we implement the ﬁne details of each safety-net
lement on a bank-by-bank basis, which allows us to obtain results
n the relative contribution of each actor in absorbing losses.
There is a rich literature on making the case for and evaluat-
ng the effects of higher capital requirements. Examples include
acroeconomic Assessment Group (2010), Miles et al. (2012), Bank
f England (2012) and European Commission (2012b). A detailed
urvey can be found in Annex 1 of European Commission (2014a).
he focus of this literature is in general the impact on GDP and
n ﬁnancial stability, and not on the issue of government bail-
uts, thus it is not straightforward to compare the outcome of this
iterature with the present paper.
The research on deposit insurance modelling is well developed,
s this type of insurance was set in place long time ago. The ﬁrst
aper dates back to Merton (1977) and since then a number of
uantitative studies have been developed to assess their features
among the others Bennett, 2002; Dufﬁe et al., 2003; Kuritzkes et al.,
002; Sironi and Zazzara, 2004; Maccaferri et al., 2013). The con-
ribution by Acharya et al. (2010) presents a setting for a deposit
uarantee scheme which also takes into account systemic risk,
hile the original paper developing SYMBOL (De Lisa et al., 2011)
uantiﬁes an optimal target level for the Italian deposit guarantee
cheme fund based on the simulated distribution of bank losses
nd corresponding failures. Finally the recent work by Anginer
t al. (2014) examines the relation between deposit insurance and
 banking crisis in the years before and during the crisis. This liter-
ture focuses in general on the estimation of the loss distribution
f deposit insurance and the evaluation of fund adequacy via credit
isk models, while we assess the added value of similar tools in
unding bank resolutions in case of a severe crisis.
Concerning the bail-in, Galliani and Zedda (2014) include this
ool in a framework based on the SYMBOL model to assess the possi-
le circular effects between a distressed banking system and public
nances. They ﬁnd that the bail-in tool is very effective in reducing
ublic ﬁnance costs. Although their analysis is limited to a subset of
ountries and not in a systemic crisis situation, Section 4.2 contains
 comparison with our results.
Turning the focus from public ﬁnances to holders of bank liabil-
ties, Conlon and Cotter (2014) make use of historical consolidated
alance sheet data from the ﬁnancial crisis to assess the counterfac-Please cite this article in press as: Benczur, P., et al., Evaluating the eff
to bail-out? J. Financial Stability (2016), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jfs
ual impact of bailing-in different categories of liabilities during the
risis. Beyond general differences in the methodology (simulation
ersus historical data), the different focus leads to additional dif-
erences. Conlon and Cotter (2014) analyse a “worst case scenario” PRESS
l Stability xxx (2016) xxx–xxx 3
for senior bondholders: all losses exceeding the available equity
and subordinated debt are absorbed by senior debt, i.e. there are
no limits on bail-in, and no additional resolution tools. In contrast,
we analyse a worst case scenario for public ﬁnances: we implement
the full safety-net, with a limit on bail-in.
Finally, there is already some literature on the advantages of
a single resolution fund over national resolution funds. The main
aspects are the possibility of breaking the vicious loop between
banks and sovereigns, and a better internalization of cross-border
externalities. Related papers include Brunnermeier et al. (2011),
Alter and Schüler (2012), Schoenmaker and Siegmann (2013) and
Fontana et al. (2015a).
Relative to existing analyses, our paper features numerous
advantages. On the conceptual side, we cover nearly all EU banks,
assess the EU-wide distribution of various notions of banking
losses, in particular the part which might have to be picked up by
public ﬁnances (bail-out), taking into account detailed components
of the banking safety-net. On the technical side, we perform robust-
ness analysis to data vintages, different levels of consolidation and
correlation structures.
In the context of our exercise, we  refer to the reduction in con-
tingent liabilities as the beneﬁts of the implemented tools. Let us
stress upfront that our exercise is limited to assessing this par-
ticular beneﬁt and no other macro costs and beneﬁts. Though we
recognize the importance of assessing the costs, their assessment is
very complex and would require the estimation of the behavioural
response of banks to various pieces of legislation. There is never-
theless a stream of existing literature performing macroeconomic
cost–beneﬁt analysis of the introduction of safety-net tools (e.g.
Breuss et al., 2015; Macroeconomic Assessment Group, 2010; Miles
et al., 2012; Bank of England, 2012; European Commission, 2012b),
which ﬁnds relatively small costs. This is reinforced by initial ex-
post studies (Cecchetti, 2014; Bridges et al., 2014).
Our results are also informative for this macro modelling setting,
since they can be used as calibration inputs in two  ways. First, mod-
elling each safety-net tool individually allows determining their
contribution to total loss absorption. This can replace the exoge-
nous assumption about these shares in Breuss et al. (2015). Second,
although not presented in this study, the SYMBOL modelling frame-
work allows some assessment in the reduction of the probability of
a systemic crisis due to the introduction of the safety-net,5 which
is a necessary ingredient to assess its macroeconomic beneﬁts (e.g.
Bank of England, 2012; European Commission, 2012b).
The remaining of this work is organized as follows. Section 2
presents the methodology, including a summary of the modelling
assumptions and a description of the way the safety-net is imple-
mented in our framework. Section 3 presents the dataset. Section
4 shows the results and robustness checks, while the last section
concludes. Finally, the Annexes present a technical description of
the SYMBOL model, some additional results, and technical details
on the construction of one of our correlation matrices.
2. Methodology
2.1. The SYMBOL model
We use the SYMBOL model to simulate losses in a given bank-
ing system. The model ﬁts within the Basel framework for banks’
minimum capital requirements. The loss distribution of an indi-ectiveness of the new EU bank regulatory framework: A farewell
.2016.03.001
5 See the discussion related to the reduction in the probability of excessive public
ﬁnance costs of a banking crisis (risk heat-map) in Benczur et al. (2015).
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iig. 1. Order of intervention of the safety-net tools. Note: TA: total assets, RF: Res-
lution Funds, DGS: Deposit Guarantee Scheme.
ensity (its ratio to Total Assets, TA). Failure of a bank is determined
y comparing the size of simulated losses and the regulatory capital
vailable to absorb the shocks. Correlated bank losses are generated
ia Monte Carlo simulations using the Basel Internal Rating Based
IRB) function (see Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 2005,
006, 2010 rev. 2011, 2013; Vasicek, 2002; Merton, 1974). The cor-
elation exists either as a consequence of the banks’ exposure to
ommon borrowers or, more generally, to a particular common
actor (for example, the business cycle); and it can also represent
ontagion among the banks.6 De Lisa et al. (2011) highlight the
mportance of this assumption in shaping the extreme tails of loss
istributions. One of our objectives with this paper is to explore the
obustness of the Commission’s ERFRA exercise to this key ingre-
ient. Section 4.3.2 discusses the correlation structures we apply,
nd Annexes 1 and 3 contain additional technical details.
For the purpose of the present exercise, each Monte Carlo sim-
lation ends when 100,000 runs with at least one bank failure are
btained. The large number of runs with at least one bank failure
nsures a sufﬁcient degree of stability in the extreme tail of the
oss distributions. As a consequence, the model needs to run for a
ew hundreds of thousands of iterations for more than 3000 banks,
hich is a major computational challenge (Muresano and Pagano,
014).
The loss distribution is simulated based on the following
ssumptions:
SYMBOL approximates all risks as if they were credit risk; no other
risk categories (e.g. market, liquidity or counterparty risks) are
explicitly considered.
SYMBOL implicitly assumes that the IRB formula adequately rep-
resents (credit) risks that banks are exposed to.
All events happen at the same time, i.e. there is no sequencing in
the simulated events.
The technical steps of the SYMBOL model are detailed in Annex
. Benczur et al. (2015) also contains some further details and
xtensions.
.2. The safety-net cascade
The full array of safety-net tools that can intervene to cover
osses and recapitalization needs, hence protecting public ﬁnances,
ncludes bail-in, Resolution Funds (RF), Deposit Guarantee Schemes
DGS), and the improved standards on minimum capital require-
ents and capital conservation buffer set up in the CRR/CRD IV
ackage.Please cite this article in press as: Benczur, P., et al., Evaluating the eff
to bail-out? J. Financial Stability (2016), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jfs
Their modelled order of intervention, reﬂecting the adopted
irective (European Parliament and Council, 2014), is sketched in
ig. 1. Countries in the EU will have to implement the bail-in tool
6 The SYMBOL model includes an optional module for simulating direct contagion
etween banks, via the interbank market. When the module is turned on, additional
osses proportional to interbank market exposures to an insolvent bank are added
n  top of the losses generated via the Monte Carlo simulation, potentially lead-
ng to further bank insolvencies. In the current analysis, we do not consider direct
nterbank contagion, as explained in Section 3.3. PRESS
l Stability xxx (2016) xxx–xxx
by January 2016, national resolution funds will be collected over
a time period of 10 years, starting from 2015, and the single reso-
lution fund will be collected over an 8 years period, starting from
2016.
According to the BRRD, under the bail-in tool, a minimum
amount of losses, equal to 8% of total liabilities plus own funds
(here measured by total assets) needs to be covered by share-
holders and unsecured creditors (ﬁrst two  boxes in Fig. 1) before
other tools can intervene. Then, if the minimum threshold of 8%
TA is satisﬁed and if the resolution authority agrees to inter-
vene, the RF can contribute to the resolution by absorbing losses
up to 5% of the total assets of the failing bank (third box in
Fig. 1).
The total size of RF ex-ante funds equals 1% of the country-level
amount of covered deposits.7 In the present exercise we  will con-
sider two  possibilities: one where the single resolution fund is in
place for countries participating in the banking union, and another
where each country has its national resolution fund.
After this, the order of intervention of the remaining tools is
subject to the discretion of the resolution authority. For instance,
additional bail-in tools could be used, the residual resolution funds
could be called to cover losses above 5% total liabilities (includ-
ing own funds) and/or parts of the deposit guarantee schemes
could also intervene as the last tool, though their funds cannot
be used for recapitalizing banks. For the purpose of the present
exercise, we consider only the tools in the grey boxes, as the
remaining ones are subject to the authorities’ discretion. More-
over, one would also need bank-level data on covered deposits
for assessing the intervention of the DGS, which is not publicly
available.
Given this regulatory framework, our analysis is based on the
following assumptions for the design of the safety-net:
• As no data is available on the amount of unsecured liabilities held
by each individual bank, we assume that all banks comply with
the minimum 8% TA threshold of capital plus unsecured liabil-
ities. In practice all banks with total capital lower than the 8%
TA threshold are assumed to meet it via bail-inable liabilities. In
case a bank holds capital higher than this threshold, there would
be no bail-in, and the whole capital will be used to bear losses.
Additional unsecured liabilities on top of this minimum is not
accounted in the analysis, as our dataset contains no data on its
size. One should note that the BRRD requires that banks meet a
minimum requirement for own  funds and liabilities eligible for
bail-in. This amount will be set on a case-by-case basis by resolu-
tion authorities, based on selected criteria set out in the BRRD. It
could thus be expected that the resolution authority will require
banks, and especially large ones, to hold more than our assumed
minimum threshold. This is also aligned with the discussion on
the total amount of loss absorbing capacity for global systemi-
cally important banks launched by the Financial Stability Board
(2014).
• According to the BRRD, the ﬁnal decision on the use of resolution
funds is left to the resolution authority. As this discretion can-
not be mathematically modelled and since our analysis focuses
on a severe crisis, in the present exercise the resolution fund is
assumed to intervene whenever necessary.
• In line with the objectives of the BRRD, safety-net tools are
assumed to be sufﬁcient, by themselves, to ensure the orderly
resolution of banks and thus prevent direct contagion effects inectiveness of the new EU bank regulatory framework: A farewell
.2016.03.001
the system. In particular, we  assume that all distressed banks are
resolved and recapitalized.
7 Covered deposits are obtained from deposits eligible for protection by the DGS
after the limit of coverage (100,000D in European countries) is applied.
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near-full sample of commercial, cooperative and savings banks
in EU 27 countries (more than 3000 banks). To maximize the
sample size, we  use robust imputation procedures of capital and
risk-weighted assets variables (see Cannas et al., 2013b for more
9 Though, in case of fund exhaustion, aggregated ﬁnancing needs remain
unchanged, their value at single bank level depend upon the order of intervention of
the  RF. In case different orders would need to be considered (from largest to smallest
banks, vice versa or random), leftover ﬁnancing needs at single bank level would beARTICLEFS-423; No. of Pages 17
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As already stressed, though not directly considered in this exer-
ise, the additional tools in the dashed box of Fig. 1 are likely to
urther absorb losses. In Section 4, we also discuss on the amount
f leftover funds in the resolution funds and DGS that remains
vailable at the end of the cascade.
.3. Technical steps of the safety-net cascade
The output of the SYMBOL simulation is a matrix of losses Ln,i,
here n denotes a simulation run and i refers to a bank. Let us
enote the expected loss for bank i by ELi (see the Annex 1 for fur-
her details). Capital is the ﬁrst source to absorb unexpected losses
ﬁrst box of Fig. 1). In this framework bank i is assumed to go into
nsolvency when simulated unexpected losses (Ln,i − ELi) exhaust
ll available capital Ki, or in other terms, when it has positive excess
osses:
ailure:=ExcLn,i = Ln,i − ELi − Ki > 0. (1)
Moreover, we also consider recapitalization needs up to 8% of
isk-weighted assets.8 This reﬂects the level of minimum capital-
zation under which a bank is considered viable under Basel rules,
nd the minimum level to which banks were recapitalized by public
nterventions in the past crisis.
Formally, the bank is assumed to be undercapitalized when
i − (Ln,i − ELi) < 8% · RWAi,
here RWAi denotes its risk-weighted assets. This leads to a matrix
f excess losses plus recapitalization needs (ExcLRn,i):
xcLRn,i = max{Ln,i − ELi − Ki + 8% · RWAi, 0}.
To save on terminology, we refer to these as ﬁnancing needs
ereafter.
In case capital is not sufﬁcient, the bank makes use of its bail-
n-able liabilities (Bailini), which are set such that its total loss
bsorbing capacity (LACi) is 8% of its total assets (TAi):
ACi:=Bailini + Ki = 8% · TAi.
The bail-in able liabilities (second block in Fig. 1) are thus set
qual to:
ailini = max{LACi − Ki, 0},
nd leftover ﬁnancing needs after bail-in-able liabilities intervene
re:
B
n,i = max{ExcLRn,i − Bailini, 0}.
In the next step (third block in Fig. 1), the RF intervenes and it
an cover ﬁnancing needs of bank i up to a ceiling equal to 5% of its
otal assets, thus ﬁnancing needs of bank i pertaining to RF are:
RF
n,i = min{LBn,i, 5% · TAi},
hile the remaining ﬁnancing needs (LB
n,i
− LRF
n,i
) will remain uncov-
red.
In this step we consider two possibilities for the RF: it can oper-
te via national compartments (NRF, National Resolution Fund) orPlease cite this article in press as: Benczur, P., et al., Evaluating the eff
to bail-out? J. Financial Stability (2016), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jfs
here can be a single fund for all the banks participating in the
anking union (SRF, Single Resolution Fund).
8 Recapitalization needs are estimated also for banks suffering from losses but
ot  exhausting all their capital (Ln,i − ELi > 0 and Ln,i − ELi − Ki < 0). However it should
e  noted that recapitalization needs in simulations where no failure is observed are
ot included, since losses in these runs are not stored for computational reasons. PRESS
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Under the NRF, in each country C the RF has at its disposal a
target fund equal to 1% of the amount of covered deposits (CovDep):
TNRF,C = 1% ·
∑
i ∈ C
CovDepi,
and the total ﬁnancing needs that each NRF is assumed to absorb
equal
LRF,Cn =
∑
i ∈ C
LRFn,i.
Under the SRF the target is equal to:
TSRF = 1% ·
∑
i ∈ Banking Union
CovDepi,
and the total ﬁnancing needs that SRF is assumed to absorb equal
LRF,Sn =
∑
i ∈ Banking Union
LRFn,i.
Summarising, in each run n the total leftover ﬁnancing needs9
not covered by any of the considered tools are:
LLeftovern =
∑
i
(LBn,i − LRFn,i) + max{L
RF,S
n − TSRF , 0}
+
∑
C /∈Banking Union
max{LRF,Cn − TNRF,C, 0} for the SRF,
LLeftovern =
∑
i
(LBn,i − LRFn,i) +
∑
C
max{LRF,Cn − TNRF,C, 0} for the NRF.
Note that leftover ﬁnancing needs in general contain both a
recapitalization and an excess loss component. Since the former
could be recouped later by selling the ﬁnancial assets acquired, it
does not represent a long-run ﬁscal cost. On  impact, however, it
still leads to a deterioration of public ﬁnances. Benczur et al. (2015)
explore this distinction on a country level, and provide a detailed
discussion.
3. Description of the data and scenarios
3.1. Description of the sample
The main ingredient to SYMBOL simulations and all the other
computations is unconsolidated bank balance sheet data, com-
ing from Bankscope, a proprietary database of banks’ ﬁnancial
statements produced by Bureau van Dijk. Our dataset covers aectiveness of the new EU bank regulatory framework: A farewell
.2016.03.001
given by the following:
LLeftover
n,i
= max
{
LRF
n,i
− max
{
TRF −
i−1∑
j=1
LRF
n,j
, 0
}
, 0
}
+ max{LB
n,i
− 5% · TAi, 0},
where the inner max  operator represents the residual fund after the RF intervened
to  cover ﬁnancing needs of banks prior to bank i; the second addend represent the
share of ﬁnancing needs beyond the scope of the RF, if any.
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Table 1
Sample used for the simulations: EU 27 aggregated amount of selected variables.
Capital and risk-weighted assets are adjusted for Basel III deﬁnitions. Population total assets exclude branches.
Year Banks’ sample bn D Population total assets bn D
Number of banks Total assets Risk-weighted assets Capital Coverage ratio
2007 3265 26,848 13,701 1047 76% 35,552
2009  3250 29,214 13,258 1230 78% 37,483
1289 75% 40,036
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Table 2
EU average capital (K) and risk-weighted assets (RWA) adjustments by banking
group due to the Basel III rules implementation.
G1 banks G2 banks
QISRWA(2012) 1.128 1.102
QISK(2012) 0.71 0.76
QISRWA(2009) 1.245 1.041
QISK(2009) 0.72 0.822012  3086 30,086 12,284 
ource: Bankscope and Schoenmaker and Peek (2014).
echnical details). European Central Bank data on aggregated banks’
otal assets for the EU (as reported by Schoenmaker and Peek,
014) are used as the statistical population to calculate the sam-
le coverage ratio, deﬁned as the share of aggregated total assets
n the sample compared to European Central Bank aggregated
gures. The sample coverage ratio is used to rescale from the sam-
le to the population losses obtained in the various steps of the
xercise.
Table 1 presents some descriptive statistics for selected input
ariables. Data used for the present exercise are as of 2007, 2009
nd 2012, and they refer to EU 27 banks. This choice allows us to
un simulations using balance sheet data “before the crisis”, “during
he crisis”, and “after the crisis”. The last two columns compare the
otal assets in the sample with the total assets from the population
f banks and ﬁgures show that the sample accounts for around
5–80% of the population.
It should be noted that capital levels and risk-weighted assets
sed in the simulations are adjusted with respect to original balance
heet data to account for the new Basel III deﬁnitions (ﬁgures in
able 1 account for these corrections), as will be detailed in Section
.2.
Besides the change in the number of banks over the three years
onsidered, one can observe a general increase of total assets and a
uch higher increase of capital, together with a reduction of risk-
eighted assets. This broad trend of deleveraging and ofﬂoading
isks is also noted in existing studies and analyses (see for exam-
le, the 2014 Banking Structures Report of the ECB). In terms of
mplications for our exercise, a decrease of risk-weighted to total
ssets is expected to decrease banking losses, while increased cap-
talization would further reduce the need for additional safety-net
r public ﬁnance interventions.
Data on covered deposits at country level are key to determine
he amount of funds available to the RF. Since they are only available
n supervisory databases, we use the ratios of covered deposits over
ustomer deposits from Campolongo et al. (2011) and Cannas et al.
2013a).
The choice of using unconsolidated data for our analyses is based
n a series of motivations that we brieﬂy discuss here.10 First, con-
olidated data can also include non-EU activities of large banking
roups, while our focus is on within-EU activities only. Second,
onsolidated data can be hardly reconciled with safety-net ele-
ents deﬁned at the national level, particularly national resolution
unds in countries outside the banking union. These are also the
wo main reasons why existing impact assessments (as listed in
he introduction) are based on unconsolidated data. Third, consol-
dation leads in general to a decrease in risk weighted assets and
apital and to a complete pooling of bail-in instruments. Though
here is indeed some pooling and sharing of risks within a bankingPlease cite this article in press as: Benczur, P., et al., Evaluating the eff
to bail-out? J. Financial Stability (2016), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jfs
roup, including parental support in particular, a complete pooling
s unrealistic. Section 4.3 further discusses some quantitative impli-
ations of using the consolidated sample and argues that the results
10 We have built a consolidated counterpart sample for 2012 using SNL Financial
hich includes 235 banks covering 80% of total assets.Source: European Banking Authority (2013), Committee of European Banking
Supervisors (2010).
based on the unconsolidated sample represent a more conservative
estimate of the performance of the safety-net.
3.2. Capital and risk-weighted assets adjustments
The crisis has brought forward, among other issues, the fact
that the quality of banks’ capital was poor and that banks’ risks
weights were not adequately calibrated under Basel II. Basel III
rules were introduced to tackle these problems (Basel Committee
on Banking Supervision, 2010 rev 2011). Since Basel III deﬁnitions
of risk-weighted assets and capital better reﬂect the true risk and
capital quality, we  adjust the SYMBOL inputs to take into account
the differences between the data in the balance sheet and those
that would have been declared if Basel III had been already imple-
mented. Corrections are based on the European Banking Authority
and the Committee of European Banking Supervisors yearly exer-
cises (Quantitative Impact Study, QIS), assessing and monitoring
the impact of the new capital standards on European banks’ bal-
ance sheet data. In particular, the studies estimate what would be
the average correction factor to move from reported capital and
risk-weighted assets to a framework compliant with the new rules.
Table 2 shows the multiplicative adjustments applied to the
data before running the simulations. As no monitoring exercise was
conducted in 2007, capital and risk-weighted assets for 2007 are
corrected using 2009 adjustments. Banks are differentiated on the
basis of their capital size: G1 banks are those whose Tier1 capital is
larger than 3 billion D , while all other banks are G2. In the following
capital and risk-weighted assets refer to the adjusted ﬁgures.
It is worth noting that, according to ﬁgures shown in Table 2, the
true amount of capital of good quality (i.e. capable to absorb losses)
was indeed much lower than the reported Basel II values, and the
deﬁnition of risk-weighted assets did not adequately capture some
risks potentially faced by the banks. For this reason, we use the
adjusted values of RWA  and capital also to calculate the IOPD and
bank losses (see Sections 2.1 and 2.2).
3.3. Scenarios implemented
The scenarios implemented in the present exercise are chosen toectiveness of the new EU bank regulatory framework: A farewell
.2016.03.001
represent the situation in the EU banking sector without any tool in
place (baseline), an intermediate situation where we assume that
bail-in is implemented (scenario 1), and a ﬁnal setting (scenario 2)
with (nearly) full implementation of the EU legislation.
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Table  3
Scenarios implemented.
RWABS is the risk-weighted assets and KBS is the capital reported in Bankscope. RWA  is the adjusted value of risk-weighted assets.
Scenario Capital Recapitalization levels RWA  Bail-in RF
BS K 8% RWA(T) RWABS(T)*QISRWA(T) N N
8% RWA(T) RWABS(T)*QISRWA(T) Y N
8% RWA(T) RWABS(T)* QISRWA(T) Y Y
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bank by bank; ﬁnally we aggregate on the system.
3. As the outcome of the step above may  not be monotonically
increasing, we smooth the distributions via a Hodrick-Prescott
11 It is important to note that being at the 99.95th percentile does not mean that
the  event happens with a probability of at most 0.05 percent. It is more appropriate
to  think about the SYMBOL (and also the Basel) probabilities as “theoretical proba-
bilities”. The Basel II criteria are such that an institution is expected to suffer losses
that exceed its capital on average once in a thousand years (a conﬁdence level of
99.9%). The regulation acknowledges that “the high conﬁdence level was also chosen
to  protect against estimation errors, that might inevitably occur from banks’ inter-
nal  probability of default, loss given default and exposure at default estimation, as
well as other model uncertainties” (see Basel Committee on Banking Supervision,
2005). Laeven and Valencia (2013) identiﬁes 17 systemic banking crisis episodes inBaseline K (T)*QIS (T) 
Scenario 1 KBS(T)*QISK(T) 
Scenario 2 max{KBS(T)*QISK(T); 10.5%*RWABS(T)*QISRWA(T)} 
The baseline scenario is meant to proxy the situation at the incep-
tion of the crisis. Therefore in this scenario we  limit ourselves to
correct the level of risk-weighted asset and capital based on the
QIS adjustments (see Section 3.2). Neither bail-in nor resolution
funds are in place.
In scenario 1 the bail-in tool is introduced.
Scenario 2 assumes that banks are fully compliant with Basel III
rules. This includes correction to the deﬁnitions of risk-weighted
assets and capital, and topping their capital up to the 10.5% of
risk-weighted assets, i.e. each bank is assumed to hold at least
the minimum capital requirements (MCR) plus the capital con-
servation buffer (CCB) in full compliance with CRR/CRD IV rules,
while keeping any excess buffer. Both the bail-in tool and the
resolution funds are in place.
The choice of the scenarios aims to reﬂect the timing and main
teps of the implementation of the legislation. Table 3 summarizes
he details of the scenarios.
Let us stress that we do not allow for direct (interbank) conta-
ion in any of the scenarios. Our baseline scenario aims to reproduce
hat happened during the ﬁnancial crisis in 2008, where a full
overnment bail-out took place and prevented domino effects
hrough the interbank market. In the other scenarios the safety-
et is assumed to be able to prevent contagion by not allowing any
istressed bank to spread losses in the system.
The Commission’s ERFRA exercise quantiﬁed the reduction in
osses between a scenario with no bail-out in place (contagion,
o safety-net, Basel II and also Basel III capital requirements) and
he case where the safety-net is implemented (and contagion is
liminated). In that case, the overall reduction in losses accounted
or two effects: eliminating contagion and including the safety-net
ools. Given our interest in assessing the reduction in the need for
uture bail-outs, our paper only evaluates the second, since the ﬁrst
as actually eliminated by the bail-out itself.
. Results: simulated loss distributions under different
afety-net scenarios
.1. The baseline scenario
Table 4 shows the distributions of ﬁnancing needs after the use
f capital available to banks for 2007, 2009 and 2012. One can see
hat these distributions are zero up until the 80th percentile, after
hich there is a steep increase. When using different data vin-
ages, we observe a notable decline in the distribution moving from
he inception of the crisis to recent years. This reﬂects the grad-
al improvement of the EU banking sector. Fig. 2 offers a graphical
omparison of the three distributions.
To facilitate the comparison of ﬁnancing needs among different
cenarios, it is useful to select a particular percentile from the dis-
ribution and focus all the analyses in its surroundings: then one
an compare individual numbers instead of full distributions. We
elect a percentile that corresponds to a situation which is similarPlease cite this article in press as: Benczur, P., et al., Evaluating the eff
to bail-out? J. Financial Stability (2016), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jfs
o the last crisis. To this aim we use data on state aid to the ﬁnan-
ial sector during the recent crisis (2008–2012): the total amount
f recapitalization measures in the period 2008–2012 was 428 bil-
ion D (European Commission, 2014b). A total of roughly 180 billionFig. 2. Simulated distribution of ﬁnancing needs of EU banks, baseline, as a share of
EU GDP.
D was  also provided to the ﬁnancial sector via asset reliefs during
the same period. These ﬁgures lead to an estimate of total ﬁnan-
cing needs due to the crisis of up to 600 billion D . A simulated
ﬁgure compatible with the above is observed between the 99.9th
and 99.95th percentiles of the distribution of ﬁnancing needs as of
2009 (see Table 4).11
4.2. Safety-net scenarios
When evaluating alternative scenarios, we  use the baseline as
reference for ordering the simulation runs and we sort the values of
all other distributions accordingly. More speciﬁcally, we implement
the following:
1. We sort the aggregated distribution of ExcLRn,i run under the
baseline scenario.
2. In the other scenarios, we order the simulation runs based on the
same ranking as in 1; then we  implement the safety-net cascadeectiveness of the new EU bank regulatory framework: A farewell
.2016.03.001
the  period 2008–2011 worldwide, and 147 episodes since 1970. Based on this, it
is  safe to say that the Basel models tend to under predict the actual frequency of
bank defaults, which then carries over to model estimates. Theoretical probabilities
cannot be thus taken literally as frequencies. Their relative magnitudes, however,
can inform us whether one bank or one country is at higher risk than another.
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Table 4
EU distribution of ﬁnancing needs, baseline scenario.
Percentiles 2007 2009 2012
Billion D GDP share Billion D GDP share Billion D GDP share
80 0.0 0% 0.0 0% 0.0 0%
82  184.3 1.5% 0.0 0% 23.8 0.2%
84  208.9 1.7% 50.6 0% 31.1 0.2%
86  226.2 1.8% 79.0 0.7% 37.0 0.3%
88  242.5 2.0% 94.7 0.8% 43.2 0.3%
90  259.2 2.1% 109.4 0.9% 50.0 0.4%
95  319.0 2.6% 157.2 1.3% 76.7 0.6%
97.5  384.8 3.1% 207.2 1.8% 109.2 0.8%
99  486.1 3.9% 287.8 2.4% 166.3 1.3%
99.5  573.6 4.6% 358.6 3.0% 220.7 1.7%
99.9 815.1 6.6% 562.6 4.8% 385.7 3.0%
99.95  933.6 7.5% 675.3 5.7% 477.7 3.7%
99.99  1239.3 10.0% 939.9 8.0% 723.8 5.6%
99.995 1394.5 11.2% 1072.0 9.1% 884.6 6.8%
282.3 10.9% 1147.3 8.9%
737.1 14.8% 1478.0 11.4%
958.7 16.6% 1529.2 11.8%
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Fig. 3. 2012 breakdown of unexpected losses absorbed by available tools, at the99.999 1670.2 13.4% 1
99.9999 2195.0 17.7% 1
100  2253.7 18.1% 1
ﬁlter to eliminate any potential noise due to the reordering. This
method has proven to be quite reliable and robust in general.
We focus our analysis on percentiles in the neighbourhood of
he crisis (99.95th percentile), to evaluate how the introduction
f different tools can reduce the ﬁnancing needs not absorbed and
otentially hitting public ﬁnances. Table 5 presents our main results
or year 2012 data. The numbers at the 99.95th percentile suggest
he following:
Introducing the bail-in has the effect of reducing leftover ﬁnan-
cing needs by up to two thirds: from 3.7% to 1.4% of the GDP in
scenario 1, and from 2.7% to 1.0% of the GDP in scenario 2.
Regarding the effect of the increased capital level as of Basel III,
we see that when moving from baseline to scenario 2, ﬁnancing
needs are reduced by one-third (from 3.7% to 2.7% of the GDP).
The introduction of NRF further halves the leftover ﬁnancing
needs after bail-in (from 1.0% to 0.5% of the GDP). The introduc-
tion of the SRF has the effect to lower these levels even further
(from 67.6 billion D to 59.4 billion D , both being roughly 0.5%
of GDP). This is because a pooled system can reallocate unused
funds from a country being less severely hit towards another
being more severely hit.
Overall, our results show that ﬁnancing needs not absorbed by
he safety-net and potentially leading to a government bail-out
ecrease considerably when all the tools are in place. In this sense,
he new EU bank regulatory framework constitutes a “farewell to
ail-out”.
Moreover, supervisors have additional tools – and the ﬂexibil-
ty on how to use them – to absorb the residual ﬁnancing needs,
ncluding additional capital buffers foreseen in CRR/CRDIV (e.g.
uffers for global systemically important banks and the counter-
yclical buffer), additional bail-in on top of the 8% minimum, the
eftover resolution funds plus additional extraordinary ex-post
ontributions12 and, only when other means deployed, the DepositPlease cite this article in press as: Benczur, P., et al., Evaluating the eff
to bail-out? J. Financial Stability (2016), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jfs
uarantee Scheme funds.
As an example, we have calculated the amount of left-
ver resolution funds after the entire safety-net has intervened
12 The resolution authority could request banks to provide additional funds for res-
lution purposes. Looking at a worst-case scenario from a ﬁscal point of view, we do
ot  model the possibility of ex-post contributions to the national/single resolution
und. Since they can go up to 3 times the ex-ante contributions, this could further
educe the impact on public ﬁnances.99.95th percentile. Note: In the left bar, the white area refers to the excess capital
buffer (above the minimum requirement). The dashed area in the middle is the
minimum regulatory capital, while the chequered area refers to excess losses.
(extraordinary contributions are not considered in this estimate).
This would be roughly 0.15% of the EU GDP when NRFs are in place,
and it would decrease to 0.1% of GDP when the SRF is in place.
These loss absorbing capacities would further increase when we
consider also the share of the DGS funds that could be used to fund
resolutions: in this case the total available funds (part of DGS plus
leftover RF) would be around 0.4% and 0.3% of the EU GDP when,
respectively, NRF and SRF are in place.
Fig. 3 visualizes the role of the various safety-net tools in
absorbing unexpected losses (Ln,i − ELi), see Eq. (1). The left bar cor-
responds to the baseline scenario, where only capital (corrected
via the QIS factor) can absorb losses. Its contribution consists of
two parts: the excess capital buffer (white area), and the minimum
regulatory capital (dashed area). On top of this, we have excess
losses (chequered area). Banks need ﬁnancial assistance not only
to cover excess losses, but also to rebuild their minimum capital.
This total ﬁnancing need is indicated by grey. Without the imple-
mented safety-net, this would most likely be covered by a publicectiveness of the new EU bank regulatory framework: A farewell
.2016.03.001
bail-out. Note that the recapitalization part of the bail-out is a pub-
lic ﬁnance cost in the short term (it would increase the gross debt
of the country), but there is a corresponding asset, which can be
sold later to recoup this part.
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Table  5
2012 EU distributions of ﬁnancing needs for all the scenarios, share of EU GDP.
FN  stands for ﬁnancing needs. Scenario 1 ﬁnancing needs after capital are identical to baseline ﬁnancing needs after capital since the capital levels are equal. LAC: loss
absorbing capacity, SRF: Single Resolution Fund, NRF: National Resolution Fund.
Percentiles Baseline: no new legislation Scenario1: bail-in Scenario2: bail-in, Basel III, RF
Initial = FN
after capital
Initial = FN
after capital
Final = FN after
LAC
Initial = FN
after capital
Intermediate = FN
after LAC
Final A = FN
after SRF
Final B = FN
after NRF
80 0% 0% 0% 0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
82  0.2% 0.2% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
84  0.2% 0.2% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
86  0.3% 0.3% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
88  0.3% 0.3% 0.1% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
90  0.4% 0.4% 0.1% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
95  0.6% 0.6% 0.2% 0.1% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
97.5  0.8% 0.8% 0.3% 0.3% 0.1% 0.0% 0.0%
99  1.3% 1.3% 0.4% 0.6% 0.2% 0.0% 0.1%
99.5  1.7% 1.7% 0.6% 0.9% 0.3% 0.0% 0.1%
99.9  3.0% 3.0% 1.1% 2.0% 0.7% 0.2% 0.3%
99.95  3.7% 3.7% 1.4% 2.7% 1.0% 0.5% 0.5%
99.99  5.6% 5.6% 2.3% 4.4% 1.7% 1.2% 1.2%
99.995 6.8% 6.8% 2.7% 5.4% 2.1% 1.5% 1.5%
8.2% 3.5% 2.9% 2.9%
9.5% 4.2% 3.6% 3.6%
9.7% 4.3% 3.7% 3.7%
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bars) to 2012 (light grey bars). As expected, ﬁnancing needs after
capital in all scenarios are higher in the earlier years, as the EU
banking sector has been continuously becoming less risky (see also
13 The bail-in capacity is in our modelling framework the difference between the
8%  total assets threshold and the amount of total capital.
14 Consider two banks, A and B that form a group. Suppose that A is risky, and B is99.999 8.9% 8.9% 4.3% 
99.9999 11.4% 11.4% 5.0% 
100  11.8% 11.8% 5.2% 
The middle bar, corresponding to scenario 1, shows that the bail-
n substantially reduces leftover ﬁnancing needs. Bail-in takes up
art of excess losses and part of recapitalization needs (the split is
ot shown on the ﬁgure), leaving the remaining parts (if any) to
 potential bail-out. Finally, when moving to scenario 2, both the
ncreased minimum capital requirements and the additional tools
elp further reduce leftover ﬁnancing needs.
Our ﬁnding of the effectiveness of the bail-in tool matches the
esults of Galliani and Zedda (2014), who ﬁnd that bail-in is very
uccessful in absorbing bank losses in selected European countries,
nd in particular it mitigates the banking-sovereign loop. It is nev-
rtheless difﬁcult to perform a direct quantitative comparison of
he two sets of results. Galliani and Zedda (2014) present the
xpected value of ﬁnancing needs conditional on at least bank fail-
re in each simulation run, while we look at a much more extreme
easure, the 99.95th percentile. They thus have much lower ﬁnan-
ing needs before bail-in, and hence this tool can absorb almost
ll losses (95/97% of losses depending on the considered country).
hey also present simulations under a setting where direct conta-
ion via the interbank market is not stopped by the safety-net. In
hat case, bail-in reduces the average conditional ﬁnancing needs
y 45–75%.
.3. Robustness checks
We  next perform some robustness checks. The ﬁrst exercise
mplements the safety-net scenarios using different data vintages,
amely 2007 and 2009 data. The second exercise tests different cor-
elation structures among banks. Detailed results are available in
nnex 2, here we only discuss the broad results. In particular, we
nly focus on the 99.95th percentile values.
In addition, we also perform a robustness check to test how
esults vary when using consolidated data (complete results are
ot reported but are available upon request). Based on a sample of
35 EU 27 banks accounting for 80% of the population total assets,
e ﬁnd that ﬁnancing needs in the baseline and in the Basel III sce-
ario are similar to the ones obtained using unconsolidated data.
inancing needs after bail-in and after the entire cascade are instead
uch lower for consolidated data. In terms of the proportional con-Please cite this article in press as: Benczur, P., et al., Evaluating the eff
to bail-out? J. Financial Stability (2016), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jfs
ributions of individual tools, moving to the consolidated sample
ncreases substantially the impact of bail-in. The contribution of
he RF also increases but to a smaller degree. The impact of CRDIV
emains almost the same.Fig. 4. Comparison over years of the leftover ﬁnancing needs after each safety-net
tool in each scenario, 99.95th percentile, share of EU GDP.
The main difference is thus in the impact of bail-in, the consol-
idated sample leading to a much better performance of this tool.
While in general we prefer the conservative estimate based on the
unconsolidated sample, there are some aspects of the consolida-
tion process which lead to an overestimation of the impact of this
tool. In particular the consolidated sample has lower excess cap-
ital and thus increased bail-in capacity.13 Moreover consolidation
implies that distressed banks in a banking group can make use of
any residual bail-in available at group level.14
4.3.1. Different vintages
Fig. 4 displays the impact of the choice of the data vintage on
the evolution of leftover ﬁnancing needs, moving from 2007 (blackectiveness of the new EU bank regulatory framework: A farewell
.2016.03.001
much less so. When looking at them in an unconsolidated way, the ﬁnancing needs
of  A would be taken over by bail-in, but it would stop at 8% of its own total assets;
Bank B, on the other hand, would be left with unused bail-in capacity. When looking
at  the group level, bail-inable funds of bank B would be called in to bear losses for
bank A.
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Though the different correlation matrices have a sizable effect
on the absolute level of our results, we  ﬁnd a very different pattern
when we  look at the proportional changes between and withinig. 5. Comparison over years of the relative reduction in ﬁnancing needs due to
he  various tools, 99.95th percentile.
ologna et al., 2014; Cohen and Scatigna, 2014). This is also true
fter bail-in and after RF. Under Basel III capital requirements (sce-
ario 2), the differences are much smaller.
It is also instructive to compare proportional changes between
nd within scenarios across different data vintages. We  look at
hree such measures. The effect of Basel III capital requirements is
btained by comparing the reduction in ﬁnancing needs after cap-
tal between the baseline and scenario 2. The effect of bail-in can
e assessed by calculating the relative difference in (i) ﬁnancing
eeds after capital in the baseline and those after bail-in in sce-
ario 1, or (ii) ﬁnancing needs after capital and those after bail-in
n scenario 2 (two different capital levels). The effect of the (S)RF is
he relative difference in ﬁnancing needs after bail-in and after RF in
cenario 2.
The left panel of Fig. 5 shows that the effect of increased min-
mum capital requirements is higher in 2007 and 2009. This is
ecause scenario 2 involved a topping up of capital to Basel III mini-
um capital requirements (as discussed in Section 3.3), and its size
s larger for the earlier years. The effect of the bail-in tool, on the
ther hand, is almost identical across years (middle panel), while
he impact of the RF is similar in 2009 and 2012, and is smaller in
007.
.3.2. Different correlation structures
De Lisa et al. (2011) demonstrated that the degree of correlation
mong banks has a major impact on the extreme tail percentiles
f the distribution of DGS losses, which increase strongly as the
orrelation coefﬁcient increases. In our exercise, however, we  are
ooking at banks from multiple countries, which calls for a distinc-
ion between within- and between-country correlations (entering
n Step 2 of SYMBOL, as detailed in Annex 1). Results presented so
ar have been obtained imposing an equal correlation of 0.5 among
ll banks, regardless of their country of operation. In terms of the
ull correlation matrix 1:
˙1]i,j =
{
1 i = j
0.5 i /= j .
he calibration of 1 is based on the analysis of Sironi and Zazzara
2004) for Italy, who estimated this value using asset price devel-
pments for Italian banks. This choice was applied in a country
y country simulation setup in the Commission’s ERFRA exercise,Please cite this article in press as: Benczur, P., et al., Evaluating the eff
to bail-out? J. Financial Stability (2016), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jfs
hich is our main starting point. Having developed a method to
imulate all EU banks together, we then adopted this assumption
or all banks. PRESS
l Stability xxx (2016) xxx–xxx
In this section we  consider three other correlation matrices, with
the objective of exploring the robustness of the ERFRA results. Our
choices are only illustrative, demonstrating potential directions of
departure from 1. The correlation matrix 2 sets the correlation
factor to 0.5 for all banks belonging to the same country, and to
zero among banks belonging to different countries. This means
that there is no common component of banking shocks in different
countries. The correlation matrix 3 represents an intermediate
situation where banks belonging to the same country have a corre-
lation factor equal to 0.6 and banks belonging to different countries
have a correlation factor equal to 0.3. This allows for a common
component across countries, but banks of the same country are
still subject to a higher degree of commonality. The possibility of
imposing a different correlation between banks within the same
country and banks in different ones represent an improvement over
versions of SYMBOL used in all previous applications.
Formally:
[˙2]i,j =
{
1 i = j
0.5 i /= j ∧ Ci = Cj
0 i /= j ∧ Ci /= Cj
, [˙3]i,j =
{
1 i = j
0.6 i /= j ∧ Ci = Cj
0.3 i /= j ∧ Ci /= Cj
,
where i and j are two banks in the sample and Ci and Cj are the
corresponding countries.
The fourth correlation matrix 4 tries to reﬁne the pattern of
cross-country correlations, by using information on cross-country
exposures published by the Bank for International Settlements
(BIS).15 The full details of its construction are reported in Annex
3, here we only brieﬂy summarize the main ingredients. Our start-
ing point is 3, and we  want to introduce some differences in the
degree of co-movements among different countries, guided by the
BIS data on cross-country exposures.
First we created a matrix of cross country exposures, as a pro-
portion of total assets in the home country. To obtain a symmetric
matrix, we took the average of the i − j and j − i values. Then we
divided country pairs into low, medium and high exposure groups,
with assumed correlation values of 0.3, 0.4 and 0.5. The within-
country correlation was  kept at 0.6. The implied matrix, however,
is not necessarily a proper correlation matrix.16 To solve this prob-
lem, we used the alternating projection method of Higham (2002)
to compute the nearest symmetric positive deﬁnite (“proper”) cor-
relation matrix. The ﬁnal correlation matrix is similar to 1.
Fig. 6 shows the results for 2012 for all the investigated cor-
relation structures (results for 2007 and 2009 are available upon
request). When comparing results with 1 and 2, we ﬁnd that
imposing the same asset correlation within and between countries
leads to larger ﬁnancing needs. For instance, baseline ﬁnancing
needs obtained with 2 (light grey bars) are roughly 40% of those
obtained using 1 (dark grey bars). Moreover, ﬁnal ﬁnancing needs
after the SRF intervention obtained with 2 are 26% of those
obtained using 1. Our choice for 3 (medium grey bars) leads
to results in between the other two  choices. Relative to 1, 3 has
a higher within-country correlation and a lower between-country
correlation. For the 99.95th percentile, the latter dominates and
leads to lower ﬁnancing needs. Results obtained with 4 are very
close to those obtained with 1. Relative to 1, results with 4
are higher, demonstrating again that a higher degree of correlation
leads to higher values at extreme tail percentiles.ectiveness of the new EU bank regulatory framework: A farewell
.2016.03.001
15 Available at http://www.bis.org/statistics/consstats.htm.
16 Intuitively, it might happen that country A has high exposures with all other
countries, but then this puts a lower bound on the correlation among all other
country pairs, which is not necessarily reﬂected in their direct cross-exposures.
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Fig. 6. Comparison over different  of the leftover ﬁnancing needs after each safety-
net  tool in each scenario, 99.95th percentile, share of EU GDP, 2012.
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big. 7. Comparison over different  of the relative reduction in ﬁnancing needs due
o  the various tools, 99.95th percentile, share of EU GDP, 2012.
cenarios. As shown in Fig. 7, the relative impact of the various
lements of the safety-net is remarkably stable across the four dif-
erent correlation matrices.
Overall, the robustness exercises show that though estimated
ercentiles may  depend sizably on various modelling choices, the
roportional changes are remarkably stable. This is particularly true
bout the standalone impact of the bail-in tool: in all cases, it leads
o a roughly 60% reduction in public ﬁnance costs. At the same
ime, we do not view any of the implemented correlation struc-
ures as adequately capturing the commonality in banking shocks
nd believe that further work is warranted on this issue. We are cur-
ently working on two main improvements: using better interbank
etwork data to reﬁne the direct contagion module of SYMBOL;
nd extending Sironi and Zazzara (2004) to all EU banks in order
o assess the broad co-movement of bank asset values. However,
oth would be out of the scope of our current exercise.
. Conclusions
In this work we assessed how the safety-net tools proposed in
he EU legislation strengthening the ﬁnancial system reduce ﬁnan-
ing needs (excess losses and recapitalization needs) that originate
n the banking sector and can potentially hit public ﬁnances. We
uilt upon a well-established micro-simulation model (SYMBOL),Please cite this article in press as: Benczur, P., et al., Evaluating the eff
to bail-out? J. Financial Stability (2016), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jfs
hich uses banks’ balance sheet data to simulate the joint distri-
ution of banking losses. For any realization of banking losses, we
pplied the safety-net tools in line with the legislation adopted
y EU institutions, in particular increased capital requirements, PRESS
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bail-in and resolution funds. We assumed that the safety-net is able
to resolve every distressed bank, hence there would be no bank fail-
ure and direct contagion through interbank market. Then we looked
at a particular percentile of this distribution (99.95), corresponding
to a systemic crisis comparable to the recent one.
We ﬁnd that the introduction of this safety-net leads to a
“farewell to bail-out” by bringing about a sizable reduction in
the ﬁnancing needs not absorbed by available tools, which could
potentially be covered by public ﬁnances during periods of severe
ﬁnancial distress. The estimated total reduction in ﬁnancing needs
not absorbed by any tool is around 90%. Within this overall reduc-
tion, increased capitalization, including the capital conservation
buffer, seems to be able to decrease ﬁnancing needs by about 30%.
Bail-in seems to play an even larger role, reducing them by around
60%. The resolution fund helps further, with a single resolution fund
being slightly more efﬁcient than a set of national resolution funds.
In our analysis we  have also checked that results remain robust
with different data vintages and with different correlation struc-
tures among banks. It is particularly true about the standalone
contribution of bail-in.
Though we  view this as a strong justiﬁcation for the recent
ﬁnancial sector reform agenda, our analysis does not address two
important issues. First, where would the very large amount of ﬁnan-
cial needs, and especially of excess losses, potentially absorbed by
bail-in end up (see Fontana et al., 2015b)? In case the holders of bail-
in liabilities were still in the banking or the shadow banking sector,
or they were systemically important ﬁnancial institutions, bail-in
could in fact re-introduce contagion among ﬁnancial institutions.
Second, what are the costs of the safety-net? Ex-ante studies
seem to rather unanimously ﬁnd limited macro-economic costs of
the reforms (see Macroeconomic Assessment Group, 2010; Miles
et al., 2012; Bank of England, 2012; European Commission, 2012b).
This is reinforced by initial ex-post studies (Cecchetti, 2014; Bridges
et al., 2014). In our view, however, patterns of lending activities and
funding costs of banks will need to be monitored continuously once
the reforms will be fully implemented. In particular, even limited
impacts could be felt asymmetrically in certain segments of the
banking sector, its customers or its investors (small and medium
enterprises, for example). We believe that further research in these
areas is needed.
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Annex 1: Steps of the SYMBOL model.
STEP 1: Estimation of the Implied Obligor Probability of Default of
the portfolio of each individual bank.
The main ingredient of the model is the average implied obligor
probability of default of a bank. It is a single parameter describing itsectiveness of the new EU bank regulatory framework: A farewell
.2016.03.001
entire loss distribution. It is obtained by numerical inversion of the
Basel IRB formula for credit risk, based on total minimum capital
requirements declared in the balance sheet. Individual bank data
needed to estimate the implied obligor probability of default are
 IN PRESSG ModelJ
1 ancial Stability xxx (2016) xxx–xxx
b
f
m
d
d
u
c
C
w
t
R
w
t
M
w
t
s
M
w
o
o
t
f
b
C
w
r
t
a
S
h
i
p
l
b
√ARTICLEFS-423; No. of Pages 17
2 P. Benczur et al. / Journal of Fin
anks’ risk-weighted assets and total assets, which can be derived
rom the balance sheet data. We  present a brief overview of the
ain ingredients below. Benczur et al. (2015) offer some additional
etails and discussion.
For each exposure l in the portfolio of bank i, the IRB formula
erives the corresponding capital requirement CRi,l needed to cover
nexpected losses17 over a time horizon of one year, with a speciﬁc
onﬁdence level equal to 99.9% (see Fig. A1.x):
Ri,l(PDi,l) =
[
LGD  ·  N
(√
1
1 −  R(PDi,l)
N−1(PDi,l)
+
√
R(PDi,l)
1 −  R(PDi,l)
N−1(0.999)
)
−  PDi,l · LGD
]
· M(PDi,l),
here PDi,l is the default probability of exposure l, R is the correla-
ion among the exposures in the portfolio, deﬁned as
(PD) = 0.12 · 1 − e
−50PD
1 − e−50 + 0.24 ·
(
1 − 1 − e
−50PD
1 − e−50
)
− 0.04 ·
(
1 − S − 5
45
)
ith obligor size S = 50.
Here LGD is the loss given default18 and M(PDi,l) is an adjustment
erm, deﬁned as
(PDi,l) =
(1 + (M − 2.5) · bi,l) · 1.06
1 − 1.5 · bi.l
ith bi,l = (0.11856 − 0.05478 · ln(PDi,l))2 and maturity M = 2.5. Note
hat here all parameters are set to their regulatory default values.
The minimum capital requirement of each bank i is obtained
umming up the capital requirements for all exposures:
CRi =
∑
l
CRi,l · Ai,l,
here Ai,l is the amount of the exposure l.
As there are no available data on banks’ exposures towards each
bligor, the model estimates the default probability of a single
bligor (implied obligor probability of default, IOPD) equivalent to
he portfolio of exposures held by each bank by inverting the above
ormulas. Mathematically speaking, the model computes the IOPD
y numerically solving the following equation:
R(IOPDi) ·
∑
l
Ai,l = MCRi,
here MCRi and
∑
lAi,l are respectively the minimum capital
equirement, set equal to 8% of the risk-weighted assets, and the
otal assets of the bank. Note that capital and RWA  are QIS-adjusted,
s detailed in Section 3.2.
TEP 2: Simulation of correlated losses for the banks in the systemPlease cite this article in press as: Benczur, P., et al., Evaluating the eff
to bail-out? J. Financial Stability (2016), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jfs
Given the estimated IOPD, SYMBOL simulates correlated losses
itting banks via Monte Carlo, using the same IRB formula and
mposing a correlation structure among banks.19 The correlation
17 Banks are expected to cover their expected losses on an ongoing basis, e.g. by
rovisions and write-offs. The unexpected loss, on the contrary, relates to potentially
arge losses that occur rather seldom. According to this concept, capital would only
e  needed for absorbing unexpected losses.
18 Set in Basel regulation equal to 45%.
19 The asset value of each bank’s debtors evolves according to XA,k =
√
RA(
√
  ˇ +
1 − ˇA) +
√
1 − RAZA,k . Here ZA,k is the idiosyncratic shock to the debtor, ˇA isFig. A1.x. Individual bank loss probability density function. Note: MCR: minimum
capital requirements, VaR: value-at-risk.
exists either as a consequence of the banks’ exposure to common
borrowers or, more generally, to a particular common factor (for
example, the business cycle). In each simulation run n = 1, . . .,  N0,
losses for bank i are simulated as:
Ln,i =  LGD  ·  N
[√
1
1  −  R(IOPDi)
N−1(IOPDi)  +
√
R(IOPDi)
1  −  R(IOPDi)
N−1(˛n,i)
]
,
where N is the normal distribution function, and N−1(˛n,i) are corre-
lated normal random shocks with correlation matrix  (see Section
4.3.2 for its potential deﬁnitions).
STEP 3: Determination of bank failure
Given the matrix of correlated losses, SYMBOL determines
which banks fail. As illustrated in Fig. A1.x, a bank failure happens
when simulated obligor portfolio losses (L) exceed the sum of the
expected losses (EL)  and the total actual capital (K) given by the
sum of its minimum capital requirements plus the bank’s excess
capital, if any:
Failure:=Ln,i − ELi − Ki > 0.
The light grey area in Fig. A1.x represents the region where losses
are covered by provisions and total capital, while the dark grey
one shows when banks fail under the above deﬁnition. It should be
noted that the probability density function of losses for an individ-
ual bank is skewed to the right, i.e. there is a very small probability
of extremely large losses and a high probability of losses that are
closer to the average/expected loss. The Basel Value at Risk (VaR)
corresponds to a conﬁdence level of 0.1%, i.e. the minimum capital
requirement covers losses from the obligors’ portfolio with prob-
ability 99.9%. This percentile falls in the light grey area, as banks
generally hold an excess capital buffer on top of the minimum cap-
ital requirements. The actual level of capital held by each bank i
determines the failure event.
STEP 4: Aggregate distribution of losses for the whole system.
Aggregate losses are obtained by summing losses in excess of
capital plus potential recapitalization needs of all distressed banks
in the system (i.e. both failed and undercapitalised banks) in each
simulation run.ectiveness of the new EU bank regulatory framework: A farewell
.2016.03.001
Annex 2: Additional results.
The tables reported here show the details of the distributions
of ﬁnancing needs for the years 2007, 2009 and 2012 for the
the bank speciﬁc shock, while  ˇ is a common component. The parameter  controls
the degree of commonality in the shocks of two different banks.
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orrelation matrix 1, and for the year 2012 for correlation matri-
es 2, 3 and 4 (results for 2007 and 2009 are available upon
equest). Results are expressed as a share of EU GDP.
Notes for the tables:
Scenario 1 ﬁnancing needs after capital are identical to baseline
ﬁnancing needs after capital, since there is no change in banks’
capitalization.
LAC: loss absorbing capacity, SRF: Single Resolution Fund, NRF:
National Resolution Fund, FN: Financing Needs.
See Tables A2.1–A2.5.
nnex 3: Steps to build a correlation matrix using
ross-country exposures.
This approach makes use of information on cross-country expo-
ures published by the Bank for International Settlements (BIS,
ttp://www.bis.org/statistics/consstats.htm), in order to build aPlease cite this article in press as: Benczur, P., et al., Evaluating the eff
to bail-out? J. Financial Stability (2016), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jfs
orrelation matrix which allows some differentiation in the degree
f co-movement of banking shocks in different countries.
The BIS publishes, on a quarterly basis, banking data which
apture the consolidated positions of banks with respect to
able A2.1
007 EU distributions of ﬁnancing needs for all the scenarios, correlation matrix 1, shar
Percentiles Baseline: no new legislation Scenario1: bail-in 
Initial = FN
after capital
Initial = FN
after capital
Final = FN
after LAC
80 0% 0% 0% 
82  1.5% 1.5% 0.2% 
84  1.7% 1.7% 0.3% 
86  1.8% 1.8% 0.3% 
88  2.0% 2.0% 0.4% 
90  2.1% 2.1% 0.4% 
95  2.6% 2.6% 0.6% 
97.5  3.1% 3.1% 0.8% 
99  3.9% 3.9% 1.1% 
99.5  4.6% 4.6% 1.4% 
99.9  6.6% 6.6% 2.4% 
99.95  7.5% 7.5% 2.9% 
99.99  10.0% 10.0% 4.3% 
99.995  11.2% 11.2% 5.0% 
99.999  13.4% 13.4% 6.9% 
99.9999 17.7% 17.7% 7.8% 
100  18.1% 18.1% 8.0% 
able A2.2
009 EU distributions of ﬁnancing needs for all the scenarios, correlation matrix 1, shar
Percentiles Baseline: no new legislation Scenario1: bail-in 
Initial = FN
after capital
Initial = FN
after capital
Final = FN
after LAC
80 0% 0% 0% 
82  0% 0% 0% 
84  0.4% 0.4% 0.0% 
86  0.7% 0.7% 0.1% 
88  0.8% 0.8% 0.1% 
90  0.9% 0.9% 0.2% 
95  1.3% 1.3% 0.3% 
97.5  1.8% 1.8% 0.4% 
99  2.4% 2.4% 0.7% 
99.5  3.0% 3.0% 0.9% 
99.9  4.8% 4.8% 1.6% 
99.95  5.7% 5.7% 2.0% 
99.99  8.0% 8.0% 3.3% 
99.995 9.1% 9.1% 3.9% 
99.999 10.9% 10.9% 5.5% 
99.9999 14.8% 14.8% 6.7% 
100  16.6% 16.6% 6.9%  PRESS
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counterparties resident in other countries (called “Consolidated
banking statistics” in the BIS database). In order to obtain a cor-
relation matrix starting from these data, the following steps have
been implemented.
1. Quarterly data are averaged over the four quarters to get a sin-
gle matrix of cross-border exposures for a given year. Data are
also rescaled over the home country amount of total assets. We
denote this as EXCi,Cj , where Ci is the home country and the
counterparties are resident in country Cj.
2. The matrix EX is in general not symmetric. For this reason we
transform it into a new symmetric matrix EX*, deﬁned as the
average of the exposure of country Ci on country Cj, and of coun-
try Cj on country Ci:
[EX∗]Ci,Cj = [EX
∗]Cj,Ci =
EXCi,Cj + EXCj,Ci
2ectiveness of the new EU bank regulatory framework: A farewell
.2016.03.001
3. We split country pairs into low, medium and high exposure
groups according to their EX*  values. Near half of the pairs have
a value less than 0.5%, and are assigned to the low exposure
group. There is a second, though smaller group between 0.5%
e of GDP.
Scenario2: bail-in, Basel III, RF
Initial = FN
after capital
Intermediate = FN
after LAC
Final A = FN
after SRF
Final B = FN
after NRF
0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
0.1% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
0.1% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
0.2% 0.1% 0.0% 0.0%
0.4% 0.1% 0.0% 0.0%
0.8% 0.2% 0.0% 0.1%
1.3% 0.4% 0.1% 0.2%
2.7% 1.0% 0.5% 0.7%
3.5% 1.2% 0.8% 0.9%
5.7% 2.2% 1.8% 1.9%
6.9% 2.8% 2.4% 2.4%
9.8% 4.3% 3.9% 3.9%
11.2% 5.0% 4.6% 4.6%
11.5% 5.2% 4.8% 4.8%
e of GDP.
Scenario2: bail-in, Basel III, RF
Initial = FN
after capital
Intermediate
FN after LAC
Final A: FN
after SRF
Final B = FN
after NRF
0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
0.0% 0.0% 0% 0%
0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
0.1% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
0.2% 0.1% 0.0% 0.0%
0.4% 0.1% 0.0% 0.0%
0.7% 0.2% 0.0% 0.1%
1.1% 0.3% 0.0% 0.1%
2.4% 0.8% 0.3% 0.4%
3.3% 1.1% 0.5% 0.7%
5.4% 2.1% 1.5% 1.5%
6.3% 2.6% 2.0% 2.0%
9.0% 3.9% 3.2% 3.3%
10.7% 5.0% 4.3% 4.3%
11.1% 5.2% 4.4% 4.5%
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Table A2.3
2012 EU distributions of ﬁnancing needs for all the scenarios, correlation matrix 2, share of EU GDP.
Percentiles Baseline: no new legislation Scenario1: bail-in Scenario2: bail-in, Basel III, RF
Initial = FN
after capital
Initial = FN
after capital
Final = FN
after LAC
Initial = FN
after capital
Intermediate:
FN after LAC
Final A = FN
after SRF
Final B = FN
after NRF
80 0.26% 0.26% 0.04% 0.03% 0.01% 0.00% 0.00%
82  0.27% 0.27% 0.04% 0.03% 0.01% 0.00% 0.00%
84  0.29% 0.29% 0.05% 0.04% 0.01% 0.00% 0.00%
86  0.31% 0.31% 0.06% 0.04% 0.01% 0.00% 0.00%
88  0.33% 0.33% 0.06% 0.05% 0.02% 0.00% 0.00%
90  0.35% 0.35% 0.07% 0.06% 0.02% 0.00% 0.00%
95  0.45% 0.45% 0.12% 0.11% 0.03% 0.00% 0.01%
97.5  0.56% 0.56% 0.17% 0.18% 0.06% 0.00% 0.02%
99  0.73% 0.73% 0.23% 0.32% 0.11% 0.01% 0.05%
99.5  0.87% 0.87% 0.29% 0.46% 0.15% 0.02% 0.08%
99.9  1.31% 1.31% 0.42% 0.86% 0.28% 0.06% 0.17%
99.95  1.51% 1.51% 0.46% 1.08% 0.34% 0.12% 0.22%
99.99  2.00% 2.00% 0.58% 1.61% 0.46% 0.19% 0.33%
99.995 2.25% 2.25% 0.83% 1.90% 0.69% 0.38% 0.56%
99.999 2.73% 2.73% 1.29% 2.33% 1.11% 0.75% 0.98%
99.9999 3.19% 3.19% 1.40% 2.45% 1.22% 0.86% 1.08%
100  3.25% 3.25% 1.46% 2.50% 1.28% 0.91% 1.14%
Table A2.4
2012 EU distributions of ﬁnancing needs for all the scenarios, correlation matrix 3, share of EU GDP.
Percentiles Baseline: no new legislation Scenario1: bail-in Scenario2: bail-in, Basel III, RF
Initial = FN
after capital
Initial = FN
after capital
Final = FN
after LAC
Initial = FN
after capital
Intermediate = FN
after LAC
Final A = FN
after SRF
Final B = FN
after NRF
80 0.2% 0.2% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
82  0.3% 0.3% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
84  0.3% 0.3% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
86  0.3% 0.3% 0.1% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
88  0.3% 0.3% 0.1% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
90  0.4% 0.4% 0.1% 0.1% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
95  0.6% 0.6% 0.2% 0.1% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
97.5  0.8% 0.8% 0.2% 0.3% 0.1% 0.0% 0.0%
99  1.1% 1.1% 0.3% 0.5% 0.2% 0.0% 0.1%
99.5  1.4% 1.4% 0.4% 0.7% 0.2% 0.0% 0.1%
99.9  2.2% 2.2% 0.8% 1.4% 0.5% 0.1% 0.3%
99.95  2.6% 2.6% 0.9% 1.8% 0.6% 0.2% 0.4%
99.99  3.7% 3.7% 1.4% 2.8% 1.1% 0.6% 0.8%
99.995 4.2% 4.2% 1.7% 3.2% 1.3% 0.8% 0.9%
99.999 5.3% 5.3% 2.4% 4.9% 1.9% 1.4% 1.5%
99.9999 6.2% 6.2% 2.7% 5.7% 2.2% 1.7% 1.8%
100  11.1% 11.1% 2.8% 5.9% 2.2% 1.7% 1.8%
Table A2.5
2012 EU distributions of ﬁnancing needs for all the scenarios, correlation matrix 4, share of EU GDP.
Percentiles Baseline: no new legislation Scenario1: bail-in Scenario2: bail-in, Basel III, RF
Initial = FN
after capital
Initial = FN
after capital
Final = FN
after LAC
Initial = FN
after capital
Intermediate = FN
after LAC
Final A = FN
after SRF
Final B = FN
after NRF
80 0.1% 0.1% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
82  0.2% 0.2% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
84  0.2% 0.2% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
86  0.3% 0.3% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
88  0.3% 0.3% 0.1% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
90  0.4% 0.4% 0.1% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
95  0.6% 0.6% 0.2% 0.1% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
97.5  0.8% 0.8% 0.2% 0.3% 0.1% 0.0% 0.0%
99  1.2% 1.2% 0.4% 0.6% 0.2% 0.0% 0.1%
99.5  1.6% 1.6% 0.5% 0.9% 0.3% 0.0% 0.1%
99.9  2.9% 2.9% 1.0% 2.0% 0.6% 0.2% 0.3%
99.95  3.6% 3.6% 1.3% 2.5% 0.9% 0.4% 0.5%
99.99  5.3% 5.3% 2.1% 4.2% 1.5% 1.0% 1.1%
99.995 6.8% 6.8% 2.6% 5.3% 2.0% 1.5% 1.5%
99.999 9.8% 9.8% 4.8% 9.0% 4.1% 3.5% 3.5%
99.9999 12.4% 12.4% 5.8% 10.5% 5.0% 4.4% 4.4%
100  15.7% 15.7% 6.0% 10.8% 5.2% 4.6% 4.6%
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AT BE BG CY CZ DE DK EE ES FI FR GR HU IE IT LT LU LV MT NL PL PT RO SE SI SK UK
AT 60% 30% 30% 30% 50% 50% 30% 30% 30% 30% 40% 30% 50% 30% 50% 30% 30% 30% 30% 40% 50% 30% 50% 30% 50% 50% 40%
BE 30% 60% 30% 30 % 50 % 50 % 30 % 30 % 40 % 30% 50% 30% 40% 40% 40% 30% 30% 30% 30% 50% 50% 30% 30% 30% 30% 40% 50%
BG 30% 30% 60% 40 % 40 % 40 % 40 % 40 % 30 % 40% 40% 50% 40% 40% 40% 40% 40% 40% 40% 40% 40% 30% 40% 30% 40% 40% 30%
CY 30% 30% 40% 60% 40% 40 % 40 % 40 % 30 % 40% 40% 50% 40% 40% 40% 40% 40% 40% 40% 30% 40% 30% 40% 30% 40% 40% 30%
CZ 50% 50% 40% 40 % 60 % 30% 40% 40% 30% 40% 30% 30% 40% 40% 40% 40% 40% 40% 40% 40% 40% 30% 40% 30% 40% 40% 30%
DE 50% 50% 40% 40 % 30 % 60 % 40% 40 % 50 % 30% 50% 30% 30% 40% 50% 40% 50% 40% 40% 50% 30% 30% 40% 50% 40% 40% 50%
DK 30% 30% 40% 40 % 40 % 40 % 60 % 40% 30 % 30% 30% 30% 40% 30% 40% 40% 40% 40% 40% 30% 40% 30% 40% 50% 40% 40% 30%
EE 30% 30% 40% 40 % 40 % 40 % 40 % 60% 30% 40% 40% 30% 40% 40% 40% 40% 40% 40% 40% 40% 40% 40% 40% 50% 40% 40% 30%
ES 30% 40% 30% 30% 30% 50% 30% 30% 60% 30% 40% 30% 30% 30% 40% 30% 30% 30% 30% 50% 40% 50% 30% 30% 30% 30% 50%
FI 30% 30% 40% 40% 40% 30% 30% 40% 30% 60% 30% 30% 40% 30% 30% 40% 30% 40% 40% 30% 40% 30% 40% 50% 40% 40% 30%
FR 40% 50% 40% 40% 30% 50% 30% 40% 40% 30% 60% 30% 40% 30% 50% 40% 50% 40% 40% 50% 30% 40% 40% 30% 40% 40% 50%
GR 30% 30% 50% 50 % 30 % 30 % 30 % 30 % 30 % 30% 30% 60% 30% 30% 30% 30% 30% 30% 30% 30% 40% 40% 50% 30% 30% 30% 50%
HU 50% 40% 40% 40% 40% 30% 40% 40% 30% 40% 40% 30% 60% 40% 40% 40% 40% 40% 40% 40% 40% 30% 40% 30% 40% 40% 30%
IE 30% 40% 40% 40 % 40 % 40 % 30 % 40 % 30 % 30% 30% 30% 40% 60% 30% 40% 30% 40% 40% 30% 40% 30% 40% 30% 40% 40% 50%
IT 50% 40% 40% 40% 40% 50% 40% 40% 40% 30% 50% 30% 40% 30% 60% 40% 40% 40% 40% 50% 40% 30% 40% 30% 40% 40% 40%
LT 30% 30% 40% 40 % 40 % 40 % 40 % 40 % 30 % 40% 40% 30% 40% 40% 40% 60% 40% 40% 40% 40% 40% 30% 40% 50% 40% 40% 30%
LU 30% 30% 40% 40 % 40 % 50 % 40 % 40 % 30 % 30% 50% 30% 40% 30% 40% 40% 60% 40% 40% 40% 40% 40% 40% 40% 40% 40% 30%
LV 30% 30% 40% 40 % 40 % 40 % 40 % 40 % 30 % 40% 40% 30% 40% 40% 40% 40% 40% 60% 40% 40% 40% 30% 40% 50% 40% 40% 30%
MT 30% 30% 40% 40 % 40 % 40 % 40 % 40 % 30 % 40% 40% 30% 40% 40% 40% 40% 40% 40% 60% 30% 40% 30% 40% 30% 40% 40% 30%
NL 40% 50% 40% 30 % 40 % 50 % 30 % 40 % 50 % 30% 50% 30% 40% 30% 50% 40% 40% 40% 30% 60% 50% 40% 30% 30% 40% 40% 50%
PL 50% 50% 40% 40 % 40 % 30 % 40 % 40 % 40 % 40% 30% 40% 40% 40% 40% 40% 40% 40% 40% 50% 60% 50% 40% 40% 40% 40% 30%
PT 30% 30% 30% 30% 30% 30% 30% 40% 50% 30% 40% 40% 30% 30% 30% 30% 40% 30% 30% 40% 50% 60% 30% 30% 30% 30% 40%
RO 50% 30% 40% 40% 40% 40% 40% 40% 30% 40% 40% 50% 40% 40% 40% 40% 40% 40% 40% 30% 40% 30% 60% 30% 40% 40% 30%
SE 30% 30% 30% 30 % 30 % 50 % 50 % 50 % 30 % 50% 30% 30% 30% 30% 30% 50% 40% 50% 30% 30% 40% 30% 30% 60% 30% 30% 50%
SI 50% 30% 40% 40% 40% 40% 40% 40% 30% 40% 40% 30% 40% 40% 40% 40% 40% 40% 40% 40% 40% 30% 40% 30% 60% 40% 30%
SK 50% 40% 40% 40% 40% 40% 40% 40% 30% 40% 40% 30% 40% 40% 40% 40% 40% 40% 40% 40% 40% 30% 40% 30% 40% 60% 30%
UK 40% 50% 30% 30 % 30 % 50 % 30 % 30 % 50 % 30% 50% 50% 30% 50% 40% 30% 30% 30% 30% 50% 30% 40% 30% 50% 30% 30% 60%
Fig. A3.1. Cross-country correlation levels. Note: white cells correspond to correlation coefﬁcient of 30%; light grey cells to 40%; medium grey cells to 50%; dark grey cells to
60%.
AT BE BG CY CZ DE DK EE ES FI FR GR HU IE IT LT LU LV MT NL PL PT RO SE SI SK UK
AT 63% 35 % 32% 32% 44% 49% 31% 32% 33% 29% 40% 30% 44% 33% 50 % 31 % 34% 31% 32% 42% 44% 27% 48% 33% 48% 47% 40%
BE 35 % 72% 34% 35% 38% 49% 31% 32% 45% 28% 49% 27% 31% 43% 40 % 33 % 38% 32% 35% 53% 37% 28% 29% 36% 29% 38% 50%
BG 32 % 34 % 62% 43% 36% 39% 40% 41% 32% 38% 40% 46% 37% 40% 40 % 41 % 44% 41% 42% 41% 36% 28% 41% 33% 40% 40% 31%
CY 32 % 35 % 43% 65% 35% 39% 40% 40% 32% 38% 40% 44% 36% 40% 40% 40% 44% 40% 43% 32% 35% 29% 41% 33% 40% 39% 31%
CZ 44 % 38 % 36% 35% 73% 31% 38% 35% 25% 40% 31% 33% 50% 38% 40 % 35 % 31% 36% 35% 37% 53% 33% 43% 26% 43% 44% 29%
DE 49 % 49 % 39% 39% 31% 60% 40% 40% 49% 30% 50% 30% 31% 39% 50 % 40 % 49% 40% 39% 50% 32% 31% 40% 49% 40% 40% 50%
DK 31 % 31 % 40% 40% 38% 40% 62% 43% 31% 32% 30% 31% 37% 31% 40% 42% 41% 42% 40% 31% 39% 29% 37% 49% 37% 37% 30%
EE 32 % 32 % 41% 40% 35% 40% 43% 69% 31% 44% 39% 27% 35% 36% 40 % 47 % 44% 46% 40% 38% 39% 36% 36% 45% 37% 37% 34%
ES 33 % 45 % 32% 32% 25% 49% 31% 31% 64% 28% 41% 30% 24% 34% 40 % 30 % 34% 30% 32% 52% 34% 46% 29% 35% 29% 28% 49%
FI 29 % 28 % 38% 38% 40% 30% 32% 44% 28% 66% 29% 32% 40% 28% 30 % 45 % 29% 44% 39% 30% 43% 32% 37% 43% 37% 36% 32%
FR 40 % 49 % 40% 40% 31% 50% 30% 39% 41% 29% 61% 33% 39% 33% 50 % 39 % 49% 39% 40% 51% 30% 38% 39% 31% 39% 39% 48%
GR 30 % 27 % 46% 44% 33% 30% 31% 27% 30% 32% 33% 76% 30% 40% 30 % 28 % 26% 28% 28% 32% 41% 41% 45% 32% 27% 27% 44%
HU 44 % 31 % 37% 36% 50% 31% 37% 35% 24% 40% 39% 30% 72% 33% 40 % 37 % 33% 37% 36% 37% 51% 37% 45% 25% 45% 46% 31%
IE 33 % 43 % 40% 40% 38% 39% 31% 36% 34% 28% 33% 40% 33% 74% 30% 37 % 30% 37% 42% 35% 34% 27% 36% 38% 36% 36% 44%
IT 50 % 40 % 40% 40% 40% 50% 40% 40% 40% 30% 50% 30% 40% 30% 60% 40 % 40% 40% 40% 50% 40% 30% 40% 30% 40% 40% 40%
LT 31 % 33 % 41% 40% 35% 40% 42% 47% 30% 45% 39% 28% 37% 37% 40 % 66% 43% 45% 40% 40% 38% 29% 37% 46% 37% 37% 33%
LU 34 % 38 % 44% 44% 31% 49% 41% 44% 34% 29% 49% 26% 33% 30% 40 % 43 % 67% 43% 43% 41% 32% 37% 39% 43% 39% 38% 32%
LV 31 % 32 % 41% 40% 36% 40% 42% 46% 30% 44% 39% 28% 37% 37% 40 % 45 % 43% 65% 40% 40% 38% 29% 38% 46% 38% 37% 33%
MT 32 % 35 % 42% 43% 35% 39% 40% 40% 32% 39% 40% 28% 36% 42% 40 % 40 % 43% 40% 62% 32% 34% 30% 40% 33% 39% 39% 30%
NL 42 % 53 % 41% 32% 37% 50% 31% 38% 52% 30% 51% 32% 37% 35% 50 % 40 % 41% 40% 32% 63% 46% 41% 29% 33% 38% 38% 48%
PL 44 % 37 % 36% 35% 53% 32% 39% 39% 34% 43% 30% 41% 51% 34% 40 % 38 % 32% 38% 34% 46% 75% 52% 42% 32% 42% 44% 31%
PT 27 % 28 % 28% 29% 33% 31% 29% 36% 46% 32% 38% 41% 37% 27% 30 % 29 % 37% 29% 30% 41% 52% 71% 33% 27% 32% 32% 40%
RO 48 % 29 % 41% 41% 43% 40% 37% 36% 29% 37% 39% 45% 45% 36% 40 % 37 % 39% 38% 40% 29% 42% 33% 65% 31% 44% 45% 31%
SE 33 % 36 % 33% 33% 26% 49% 49% 45% 35% 43% 31% 32% 25% 38% 30 % 46 % 43% 46% 33% 33% 32% 27% 31% 70% 31% 31% 46%
SI 48 % 29 % 40% 40% 43% 40% 37% 37% 29% 37% 39% 27% 45% 36% 40 % 37 % 39% 38% 39% 38% 42% 32% 44% 31% 64% 45% 31%
SK 47 % 38 % 40% 39% 44% 40% 37% 37% 28% 36% 39% 27% 46% 36% 40 % 37 % 38% 37% 39% 38% 44% 32% 45% 31% 45% 66% 31%
UK 40 % 50 % 31% 31% 29% 50% 30% 34% 49% 32% 48% 44% 31% 44% 40 % 33 % 32% 33% 30% 48% 31% 40% 31% 46% 31% 31% 63%
F corres
m –75%
4ig. A3.2. Cross-country correlation levels after the correction. Note: white cells 
edium grey cells to 45–55%; dark grey cells to 55–65%; extra-dark grey cells to 65
and 1%, which is assigned to the medium exposure group.20 The
remaining pairs above 1% form the high exposure group.
. Low exposure is translated into a correlation coefﬁcient of 0.3
(like in 3 – reﬂecting only the same exposure to common risks),
medium exposure into 0.4 and high exposure into 0.5:
[CC]Ci,Cj =
⎧⎪⎪⎨ 0.3 if [EX∗]Ci,Cj ≤ 0.5%
0.4 if 0.5% < [EX∗]Ci,Cj ≤ 1% ∨ [CC]Ci,Cj = ∅
0.5 if [EX∗] > 1%Please cite this article in press as: Benczur, P., et al., Evaluating the eff
to bail-out? J. Financial Stability (2016), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jfs
⎪⎪⎩ Ci,Cj
0.65 if Ci ≡ Cj
20 Country pairs with no exposure data were also put into the middle group.pond to correlation coefﬁcients in the range 25–35%; light grey cells to 35–45%;
.
5. The matrix CC is used to build the banks’ correlation matrix 4:
the correlation between bank k and bank l is set equal to the
correlation level set in matrix CC between their home countries
Ci and Cj:
[˙4]k,l =
{
1 k = l
CCCi,Cj k /= l ∧ k ∈ Ci ∧ l ∈ Cj
6. As the correlation matrix might not be a proper correlation
matrix (i.e. it might not be positive deﬁnite), we  apply the alter-
nating projection method by Higham (2002). This algorithm,
commonly used in this context, computes the nearest symmetricectiveness of the new EU bank regulatory framework: A farewell
.2016.03.001
and positive deﬁnite correlation matrix.
To visualize the outcome of this procedure, and also the effects
of this correction on the cross-country correlation coefﬁcients,
 ING ModelJ
1 ancia
F
w
t
c
c
c
(
R
A
A
A
A
B
B
B
B
B
B
B
B
B
B
B
B
B
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
D
D
D
EARTICLEFS-423; No. of Pages 17
6 P. Benczur et al. / Journal of Fin
ig. A3.1 present the original cross-country correlation coefﬁcients,
hile Fig. A3.2 shows the corresponding values after the correc-
ion The shading in the two charts reﬂects similar correlation
oefﬁcients. By comparing the two charts, one can notice that cross-
ountry correlation levels do not change signiﬁcantly after the
orrection, only domestic correlations increase for some countries
from 60% to more than 70%).
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